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The quoted covenant avoids this result by requiring, in effect, that resort to
financing by sale and leaseback be had only when the company might incur
more funded indebtedness as an alternative. But if the business world shows its
intention to treat the sale and leaseback agreement as a loan for one purpose,
it ought not to be shocked if the Bureau of Internal Revenue formulated the
policy of so treating the transaction for tax purposes. Similarly, since manage-
ment has been willing to permit the treatment of the leaseback as a loan for one
purpose, an inference may be drawn as to acceptable methods of accounting
disclosure. The special security clauses in bond indentures stand as condemna-
tions of the present balance sheet treatment of sale and leaseback transactions.
Full disclosure of information about leaseback arrangements in the annual
reports to stockholders will give them the opportunity of making informed
judgments for themselves. However, since there is no regulating agency with
the power to prescribe uniform accounting practices for industrial and mer-
chandising corporations, it is likely that a considerable length of time will pass
before the needs of investors and creditors will be able to effect adequate
balance sheet presentation for leaseback arrangements in the annual reports to
stockholders through the medium of concerted pressure upon corporations by
the Securities and Exchange Commission, investors' services, the accounting
profession and the bar.
LEGAL BARRIERS CONFRONTING THIRD PARTIES: THE
PROGRESSIVE PARTY IN ILLINOIS
Recent events have produced considerable controversy as to whether or not
statutory provisions in the various states present a serious obstacle to the suc-
cess of minority political parties.' To the traditional view that existing statutes
have a controlling adverse effect has been opposed the view of a small number
of political scientists who contend that the purported lack of success of minority
parties is due, in the main, to factors more deeply imbedded in our political
structure.3 This latter view seems to have received at least some confirmation
from the elections of November 1948 in which the newest of the "third parties,"
the Progressive Party, was able to obtain a place on the ballot in forty-five
states, but received surprisingly little support.
Illinois was the scene of the most heated fight with respect to the right of the
Progressive Party to appear on the ballot. Candidates for offices within Cook
County were able to secure their places only after protracted litigation in the
state courts, and candidates for national and state-wide offices were barred al-
x A tabulation of the statutory provisions governing minor political parties is provided in
Legal Obstacles to Minority Party Success, 57 Yale L.J. 1276, 1292-97 (1948).
2Brooks, Political Parties and Electoral Problems 122, 265 (3d ed., 1933); Odegard and
Helms, American Politics 782 (1938).
3Sait, American Parties and Elections 3o4 (3d ed., 1942).
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together after a decision by the United States Supreme Court.4 An examination
of the legal procedures necessitated by Illinois law which, lead to these results
should illuminate the entire controversy. Several unusual questions of substan-
tive and procedural law were involved, and many provisions of the Illinois Elec-
tion Codes were construed for the first time. The United States Supreme Court
again considered the problem of the extent to which it will, under the Four-
teenth Amendment, protect civil liberties by interfering with state laws dealing
with political matters. Furthermore, the litigation was at every stage so colored
by the political climate in Illinois as to discredit any assumption that the effect
of minority party legislation can be determined merely by an examination of
the relevant statutory provisions. And finally, the litigation raises once again
the questions of the part which minority parties play in the American political
scheme and of the policy which'the courts and legislature should properly adopt
toward them.
It is proposed to examine first the legal proceedings centering around the
efforts of the Progressive Party to become an "established political party" with-
in Cook County, and then to consider the Party's efforts to place on the ballot
the names of its candidates for national and state-wide offices.
I
Article io of the Illinois Election Code makes a distinction between a "new
political party" and an "established political party." An established party is re-
quired to make its nominations through the mechanism of the Primary Act,6
while a new party must make its nominations by a petition procedure described
in Article ro. Section 2 of Article io provides that in the event the leading can-
didate of such new party, for any office within any subdivision of the state, shall
receive more than five per cent of the total vote cast at the next ensuing election
following the making of such nominations by petition, then that party shall be-
come an established political party within that subdivision of the state. Having
becom6 established, the party "shall thereafter nominate its candidates for pub-
lic offices... under the provisions of the laws regulating the nomination of
candidates of established political parties at primary elections ... as now or
hereafter in force."7
Section 2 of Article io also states the requirements which the nominating
petitions for new party candidates must fulfill where the candidacy is for a
county office:
4 MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948).
s Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1948) c. 46. Hereinafter referred to as Election Code.
6Election Code Art. 7.
7Election Code Art. io, § 2. Any established party will automatically lose its 'established'
status if it (i.e., its leading candidate) fails to get five per cent of the vote cast at a general
election for state and county officers within the state, county, or congressional district. Elec-
tion Code Art. 7, § 2.
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If such new party shall ne iorined for any district or political subdivision less than
the entire State, such petition shall be signed by qualified voters equalling in number
not less than five (5) per cent nor more than eight (8) per cent of the number of voters
who voted at the next preceding general election in such district or political sub-
division in which such district or political subdivision voted as a unit for the election
of officers to serve its respective territorial area .... I
On November 4, 1947, an election was held in Cook County for the purpose
of electing twenty-one judges to the Superior Court of Cook County. Prior to
this election the organizers of the Progressive Party had circulated nominating
petitions within the county and these were accepted by the County Clerk of
Cook County. No objections to the petitions were filed, and as a result twenty-
one Progressive Party candidates appeared on the November 4 ballot under
the appropriate party label.9
The leading Progressive Party candidate received forty-four per cent of the
vote cast in the county. His total included over five per cent of the vote cast in
each of the twelve congressional districts lying wholly within Cook County, in
the City of Chicago, and in the Chicago Sanitary District. The Progressives be-
lieved that this constituted them an established political party within Cook
County and each of the subdivisions thereof, and thereby entitled them to par-
ticipate in the primary election scheduled for April 13, 1948, for the purpose of
nominating candidates to be elected in the November elections.
The Party accordingly prepared to take certain steps consonant with its pre-
sumed status. Pursuant to provisions of Section 2 of Article io, the twenty-one
judicial candidates met immediately following the election and selected persons
to serve as Ward and Township Committeemen within Cook County, such per-
sons to be known as The Provisional Cook County Central Committee, having
the statutory duty of exercising "the powers conferred by law upon any party
committeeman or committeemen to manage and control the affairs of such new
political party until the next ensuing primary election at which said new political
party shall be entitled to nominate and elect any party committeeman or com-
mitteemen ... under any parts of this Act relating to the organization of
political parties."''
Section io of Article 7 provides that each candidate whose name appears on
the primary ballot shall have had filed on his behalf a petition containing the
signatures of a certainpercentage of the "qualified primary electors" of his party
within the particular district or subdivision in which he is a candidate." The
8 The petition requirements for candidates for state-wide offices are cited in note 65 infra.
9 If the petitions are in apparent conformity with the statute, and if no objections thereto
are filed, the petitions shall be deemed valid, and the receiving officer has a mandatory duty to
certify the names for appearance on the ballot. Election Code Art. io, § 8.
10 Election Code Art. 10, § 2.
x Thus, a candidate for congressional office must obtain signatures of one-half of one per
cent of the qualified primary electors in the district. Candidates for county and city offices
require the same percentages within their respective districts. Candidates for Ward Com-
mitteemen (who are actually elected and not merely nominated at the primary) require be-
tween ten and sixteen per cent. Election Code Art. 7, § 1o.
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number of primary electors is determined by the total vote cast for the candi-
date of such political party who received the highest number of votes in the
state or subdivision thereof at the last general election." Section 2 of Article 7 in
defining a political party entitled to make use of the Act states: "A political
party, which at the general election for State and County officers then next pre-
ceding a primary, cast more than 5 per cent of the vote cast in any county, is
hereby declared to be a political party within the meaning of this Article, within
the county. . . ."3 Section 4 of Article 7, however, states that the terms 'election'
or 'general election' when used in Article 7 shall not include an election at which
judges exclusively are elected, unless such definition be inconsistent with the
context.
When it affirmatively appeared that certain public officials charged with
various duties under the Election Code would, in reliance upon the above sec-
tions of Article 7, refuse to recognize the Progressive Party of Cook County as
an established party entitled to a ballot in the April primary, r and would refuse
to accept their petitions, the Progressive Party filed a complaint in the Circuit
Court of Cook County asking for declaratory relief. The complaint, filed Decem-
ber 3, 1947, named the County Clerk of Cook County and certain other public
officers as defendants, s and asked for a declaratory judgment under the Illinois
Declaratory Judgments Act 6 to the effect that the Progressive Party was an es-
tablished political party within Cook County, and that the defendants were each
under a duty to perform certain acts to the end that the party have a place in
the primary election of April 13, 1948.
The plaintiff maintained that the ambiguities of Article 7 and the apparent
impossibility of meeting its signature requirements deprived it of substantial
rights to which it was entitled by virtue of having qualified as an established
political party under Article io. The Party alleged that an actual controversy
existed with regard to the interpretation of a statute, and that it would be un-
- Election Code Art. 7, § io. 13Election Code Art. 7, § 2. Italics added.
X4 On November 22 the Progressive Party sent letters to each of several public officials
charged with duties under the Election Code, requesting clarification of the signature re-
quirements with regard to the primary election. An answer was received from the Chicago
Board of Election Commissioners denying that the Progressives were an established political
party and stating that there was no means by which they could appear on the primary ballot.
No answers were received from the other defendants. Progressive Party v. Flynn, 4oo IlI.
102, 79 N.E. 2d S16 (1948), Plaintiff's Abstract of Record at 17-21. Hereinafter referred to as
Plaintiff's Abstract.
IS Specifically, the other defendants were: the City Clerk of Chicago, charged with certain
duties with respect to the certificates of nomination for the Municipal Court of Chicago;
the Secretary of State of Illinois, charged with the duty to receive and certify petitions for
nomination of representatives in the United States Congress from the twelve congressional
districts lying wholly within Cook County; and the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners,
which has the duty of serving as an electoral board to pass upon objections to petitions for
nomination of Ward Committeemen. The relevant sections of the Election Code are Art. 7,
§§ 12-17.
16111. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1948) c. iso, § 181.1.
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able to obtain a writ of mandamus to compel defendants to act because the time
for action had not yet arrived. If the plaintiff waited until the defendants had
actually rejected the primary nominating petitions before taking action, the pri-
mary would have been held before any adjudication could be obtained.X7
The defendants, other than the defendant Secretary of State, answered
jointly, denying that the Progressives were an established political party. They
also counterclaimed asking for a declaratory judgment declaring that the Pro-
gressive Party was not an established political party because a judicial election
is not an election which may be used as the basis of establishing a new party,
and declaring that the defendants were under a duty not to receive any nomi-
nating papers.,8 The defendant Secretary of State moved to strike the complaint
and dismiss the suit, alleging that the court was without jurisdiction because all
questions involved were "political" questions and because the suit was, in sub-
stanqe, one against the State in violation of the state's immunity to suit. He
also moved to strike the counterclaim of the other defendants.9
Judgment of the trial court granting a declaratory judgment as requested by
the defendants was entered on January i6, 1948.O The Secretary of State's
motion to strike the complaint was sustained on the ground that "there is no
such established political party as the Progressive Party" but was denied on the
jurisdictional grounds. The Progressives immediately filed notice of appeal
directly to the Illinois Supreme Court-x asking for a reversal of the judgment,
retroactive to January 26 in order to permit compliance with the filing re-
quirements.
On appeal the defendants relied upon two provisions of Article 7 as denying
to the Progressive Party a right to participate in the April primary: Section 2,
which defines a political party entitled to use the primary mechanism in terms
of the vote received at the last general election for state and county officers, and
Section io, which defines signature requirements in terms of the number of
voters at the last general election. Both of these provisions are subject to the
definitions of "election" and "general election" found in Section 4 of Article 7,
which specifically exclude elections for judges only.
In their argument before the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs maintained that
they had qualified as an established political party within the meaning of Article
io. The restrictive definition of 'general election' found in Article 7 is, by its own
terms, not applicable to Article io,- and an examination of the legislative his-
17 Plaintiff's Abstract, at 11-12. '9 Ibid., at 33-35.
is Ibid., at 24-32. z° Ibid., at 35.
2 Direct appeal to the State Supreme Court is a matter of right where a franchise or a
constitutional question is involved. Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-THurd, 1948) c. io, § i99.
- Consequently the definition of "general election" applicable to Article io is that found in
Article i, § 3 of the Election Code:" 'General election' means a regular election for the choice
of a national, state, judicial, district, or county officer." "Regular election" was defined in
Elder v. Qullici, 309 Ill. App. 466, 468, 33 N.E. 2d 492, 494 (1941), as one which recurs at
stated intervals as fixed by law.
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tory of the latter article reveals no intention to exclude judicial elections from
that category of elections which could be used as the basis for establishing a new
party23 But of greater importance was the fact that the restrictive definition
of "general election" found in Section 4 of Article 7, was added as an amendment
in 1936 for the sole purpose of permitting coalition judicial tickets in Cook
County under the Democratic Party label without thereby depriving the Re-
publican Party of its status as an established political party in Cook County.24
Any doubt as to the actual purpose of the amendment is removed by the emer-
gency clause attached to the bill itself which unequivocally states the reason
for its passage.2 5
The plaintiffs then argued that while there was an apparent conflict between
Articles 7 and io as to the definition of an established political party, in fact
the definition found in Section 2 of Article io, is the only one applicable to the
establishment of a new party. The definition in Article 7 is relevant only with
regard to the conditions under which an established party may become dis-
established. In other words, it sets up the standards which an already established
party must maintain.26 Thus, the legislature intended that a new party might
become established at any election, but could lose that status only by failing to
receive the required percentage of votes at an election other than one for judges
exclusively.27
The defendants (other than the defendant Secretary of State) moved to
transfer the cause to the Appellate Court on the grounds that neither a franchise
nor a constitutional question was involved, but merely the construction of a
statute. In their answer on the merits, the defendants contended that the Pro-
gressives simply did not meet the requirements of Article 7 because they had
not received five per cent of the vote at the last general election within the
meaning of that Article. They maintained that where the words of a statute
are clear the legislative intent is not to be examined, and that here there was
really no ambiguity. Article io, they said, must be read in conjunction with
23 Progressive Party v. Flynn, 400 ll. 102, 79 N.E. 2d 516 (1948), appellant's brief, at
21-29.
24 Proclamation of the Governor, House Journal, 59th Gen. Assembly, 3d Spec. Sess.
at 4.
25 ll. L. (1936), 59th Gen. Assembly, 3d Spec. Sess., at 9.
'2 Appellant's brief, at 40.
27 Appellant further argued that if Article 7 be construed so as to deprive the Progressive
Party of the right to participate in the primary even though it had qualified as an estab-
lished political party under Article io, then appellant was being deprived of constitutional
rights. The right to nominate and vote for candidates of one's own choosing was alleged to be a
right reserved to the people by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the United States Consti-
tution, and the primary election, in which candidates for the United States Congress are in-
volved, is an election within the meaning of Sections 2 and 4 of Article I. Consequently the
fact that Article 7 discriminates against voters desiring to form a new party and in favor of
established parties makes it violative of the equal protection and due process clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Progressive Party v.'Flynn, 400 IL. 102, 79 N.E. 2d V16 (1948),
appellant's brief, at Si.
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Article 7, and when that is done the result is to remove judicial elections from
the category of elections at which new political parties can become established.28
They alleged, furthermore, that this was neither an unreasonable nor unconsti-
tutional impairment of the franchise: A party might still become established at
the bi-annual congressional elections, or in any case could get on the November
ballot via the petition method of Article io.
The defendant Secretary of State, acting through the Attorney General, filed
a brief asking for affirmance of the trial court's decision granting his motion to
strike the complaint. The Attorney General argued that equity had no jurisdic-
tion to enjoin, control, or interfere with elections, or to determine political issues
or protect political rights. Moreover, he urged, a declaratory judgment is similar
to injunction, not to mandamus, and hence is not an appropriate means for the
protection of political rights.9
The decision in Progressive Party v. Flynn30 was handed down on April 7,
1948, six days before the scheduled primary. The defendants' motion to transfer
to the Appellate Court was denied, and the court then adjudged the Progres-
sive Party to be an established political party in Cook County, stating: "This
amendment (i.e., the definition found in Article 7, Section 4) does not apply
and was not intended to apply to a political party entitled to nominate because
it became such as a result of provision of section 2 of article J0."31 No opinion
as to the efficacy or character of consequential relief was given.
Pursuant to this mandate the Circuit Court set aside its order of January
i6 and declared that the Progressive Party had the right to nominate candi-
dates in the primary. But on April 9 the Circuit Court orally denied a motion
of the Progressive Party asking for an order requiring the defendants to print
appropriate ballots. On April 12 a written order to the same effect was issued,
the court judicially noticing that it would be physically impossible to comply
in tine.2
After the primary election, the Progressive Party found itself in an unenvi-
able position with respect to its prospects of placing candidates on the ballot in
28 Ibid., appellee's brief, at 20.
29This provided appellants with an opportunity to lecture the Attorney General on the
powers of a court of equity and the nature of a declaratory judgment. A declaratory judgment
is, of course, a proceeding sui generis, and consequently the alleged limitations on the powers
of a court of equity are irrelevant. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 239-40 (2d ed., 1941).
In any event, equity is concerned with coercive remedies, and a declaration of rights is all
that was sought here, although paragraph (3) of the Illinois Declaratory Judgments Act, note
i6 supra, does authorize application for further remedies where necessary. Declaratory judg-
ment is a particularly appropriate means for the enforcement of political rights. Borchard,
supra, at 868. Appellants further contended that the often stated proposition that equity has
no jurisdiction to enforce political rights is not a correct statement of the law. See note 89
infra; Progressive Party v. Flynn, 400 Ill. 102, 79 N.E. 2d 516 (1948), appellant's reply brief,
at 7-22.
30 400 Ill. 102, 79 N.E. 2d S16 (E948). 3' Ibid., at 521.
32 Progressive Party v.Flynn, 82 N.E. 2d 476 (Ill., 1948), Defendants' Flynn, et aL., Abstract
of Record, at 41. Hereinafter referred to as Defendants' Abstract.
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November. Having been declared to be an established political party in Cook
County there was no longer available to it the method of nomination by petition
prescribed in Article io of the Election Code.33 On the other hand, it had been
unable, through no fault of its own, to take advantage of the only other avail-
able mechanism of nomination-the primary election. It sought for some meth-
od of getting on the November ballot and decided to make use of the provisions
for the filling of vacancies in nominations found in Section 6i of Article 7.34
Accordingly, the Managing Committee of the Party and various subcommittees
appointed by it selected candidates for the offices within Cook County and sub-
divisions thereof. Certificates of nomination and statements of candidacy were
presented to the appropriate public officials, who declined to accept them. The
Party, relying on the decision in Progressive Party v. Flynn, twice petitioned the
State Supreme Court, requesting that Court to exercise its original jurisdiction
in mandamus to compel the officials to receive the certificates. In each case the
Supreme Court, without opinion, declined to act, presumably because it felt
that certain factual questions were involved which should be determined by a
lower court.
The Progressives on May 28 petitioned the Circuit Court of Cook County
for an order directing the various defendants to show cause why further relief
in the nature of mandamus compelling the defendants to accept the nominating
papers that had been tendered for the various "vacant" offices should not be
granted.35 This action was predicated upon paragraph (3) of the Declaratory
Judgments Act, which makes provision for further remedies of a coercive nature
where necessary.36
The petitioner alleged that respondent's refusal to act effectively deprived it
of its rights as an established political party in Cook County and deprived its
members of their franchise.37 The defendant Secretary of State filed a motion
to strike the petition38 and the other defendants did likewise,39 alleging that
there can be no vacancy in a nomination until a nomination has been made,
and that even if such vacancy did exist the Managing Committee would be
33 Art. io, § i provides: "[N]o nominations... may be made under the provisions of this
Article io by any established political party which at the general election next preceding, polled
more than five (5) per cent of the vote cast... in the electoral district for which the nomina-
tion is made.. . " The decision in Progressive Party v. Flynn, 400 Ill. 102, 79 N.E. 2d 516
(1948), had established that the judicial election of November 1947 was a general election.
34 "In case a candidate who has been nominated under the provisions of this Article 7 shall
die before election... or should the nomination for any other reason become vacant, the
managing committee ... of the respective political party for the territorial area in which such
vacancy occurs, shall nominate a candidate or candidates of the respective party to fill such
vacancies on the ticket." Art. 8, § 17 contains a similar provision applicable to candidates for
the state legislature, and such candidates were nominated by Progressive Party Committee-
men.
35 Defendants' Abstract, at 41.
36ll. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1948) c. IIO, § 181.1(3). 38 Ibid., at 6o.
37 Defendants' Abstract, at 57. 39 Ibid., at 6i.
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powerless to fill it since the statutory authority of that Committee had expired
with the April primary.
The final order of the Circuit Court issued on June 8 accepted in substance
petitioner's contentions and authorized them to place names on the November
ballot by virtue of the vacancy provisions of Section 6i of Article 7 and Section
17 of Article 8.40 Each of the defendants was separately ordered to perform all
of the acts within the scope of his authority to the end that Progressive Party
candidates might appear on the Cook County ballot in November. The respond-
ents (other than the Secretary of State) immediately filed an appeal to the Ap-
pellate Court asking for reversal. At the same time, the Attorney General, pur-
portedly acting on behalf of the Secretary of State, appealed directly to the
State Supreme Court, also asking for reversal. The Progressive Party filed a
cross appeal in the Supreme Court asking that certain language of the trial court
be amended so as to remove the possibility of future uncertainty.
At this stage of the proceedings Attorney General George F. Barrett parted
company with his statutory client, Secretary of State Edward J. Barrett. Secre-
tary Barrett requested that he be permitted to join the other defendants in the
Appellate Court proceedings, and entered his appearance there pro se.41 The
Attorney General, nevertheless, insisted upon his exclusive right to "defend"
the Secretary of State and proceeded to file briefs and arguments in his behalf
in the Supreme Court.Y
The rather unusual situation which followed from the difference of opinion
between the two state officers is explainable only in light of Illinois politics. At
the time of the action, all of the state officials including the Attorney General
were members of the Republican Party. The one exception was the Secretary
of State, a Democrat. The Cook County defendants were for the most part
Democratic. During the summer it became apparent to the Republicans that
the presence of the Progressive Party on the ballot would serve to draw voting
strength away from the Democrats, a result to which they would hardly be
averse. The Democrats, however, had equally good reason to wish the Progres-
sives kept off the ballot.43
4' Tbid., at 64. The accompanying oral opinion indicates that the court's decision was predi-
cated less upon the actual merits of the statutory construction argument than upon general
equitable principles. "The time element alone prevented the party from appearing on the
ballot at the primary. To hold that they were not able to nominate by their party machinery
would be to state that they were given a right without a remedy." Ibid., at io3.
41 Ibid., at 88.
42It should be noted that the duties which the petitioner was seeking to compel the various
defendants to perform were separate and distinct from one another, and the trial court's order
had been directed to each of the defendants individually. The Secretary of State had statutory
duties only with respect to candidates for Congress and for Representatives in the General
Assembly. Hence there was nothing to prevent the Secretary of State from conducting his suit
apart from the other defendants.
43The actual results of the November 2 elections indicate that the Republican hopes and
the Democratic fears were in vain. All Democratic candidates for state offices won by such
large margins that it is extremely unlikely that the presence of Progressive Party candidates
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Following the Circuit Court's order of June 8, the Progressives were natural-
ly desirous of obtaining a final adjudication by the State Supreme Court in
order to avoid any difficulties which might arise from the physical impossibility
of printing ballots in a short time. The Attorney General was quite willing to
concur with this objective. The other respondents (including the Secretary of
State appearing pro se) maintained that no constitutional issue or franchise was
involved in this appeal, and consequently the Supreme Court had no jurisdic-
tion on direct review.
On July i, the defendant-appellants in the Appellate Court moved that
court for an order of supersedeas, and on July ig, after argument, the motion
was granted and the Notice of Appeal made to serve as a supersedeas suspend-
ing execution of the trial court's judgment.44 At the same time, appellee ap-
peared specially in the Appellate Court and moved to transfer the cause to the
Supreme Court, arguing that the Appellate Court had no jurisdiction over the
cause. After denial of this motion, the Party filed a motion in the Supreme Court
asking for leave to file a petition for that Court's auxiliary process to compel
transfer of the cause and for expunction of the supersedeas.
The motion was granted on August 1g and the petition immediately filed.
The Progressives maintained that the appeal did involve both a franchise and
constitutional issues4S and hence the Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction.
Consequently the supersedeas issued by the Appellate Court would be coram
nonjudice and void. The Attorney General, still purportedly acting for the Sec-
retary of State, answered the petition and strongly supported it, devoting con-
siderable attention to justifying his rather unusual status in the proceedings.4 6
The other defendants appeared specially in the Supreme Court to contest
on the ballot would have altered the result even if all their votes had been drawn from the
Democratic ticket. See Official Vote of the State of Illinois Cast at the General Election
November 2, 1948 (Office of the Secretary of State, Springfield).
44 Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1948) c. 110, § 206(3).
45 The Progressive Party's petition for a rule to show cause had alleged that a refusal to
place the party on the ballot would deprive its members of constitutional rights guaranteed
by Article II, § 4, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and
Article II, §§ 2, i8, i9 of the Illinois Constitution. Defendants' Abstract, at 57.
46 "[Wlhile the Attorney General represents the Secretary of State in his official capacity
and is indeed his only advisor and sole legal representative in the courts and elsewhere, he is
under no duty whatsoever to assist such public official in concealing from this Court the situa-
tion relating to itsjurisdiction or that of the Appellate Court, and, on the contrary, as the chief
law officer of the people and as an officer of this Court, he is under a duty to the people of the
State of Illinois and to this Court to present the considerations which lead him irresistibly to the
conclusions that, a franchise and constitutional questions necessary (sic) being involved, this
Court has exclusive jurisdiction ...... (italics in original). Progressive Party v. Flynn, 82
N.E. 2d 476 (ill., 1948), Answer of Defendant E. J. Barrett, Secretary of State, by George F.
Barrett, Attorney General, at 5. For further discussion of the manner in which the Attorney
General has performed his duty to the People of Illinois, see Katz, An Open Letter to the
Attorney General of Illinois, 15 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 251 (1948); editorials in the St. Louis Post-
Dispatch: p. 2B, col. 3 (Oct. 7, 1948); p. 2C, col. 3 (Oct. 22, 1948); p. 2C, col. 2 (Oct. 24, 1948);
p. 2B, col. 3 (Oct. 25, 1948); p. 2C, col. 2 (Oct. 27, 1948).
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the petition, and argued that no constitutional question was presented for re-
view inasmuch as the final order of the trial court had been rendered on other
issues-namely, the construction of the vacancy provisions of the Election Code.
Nor is a franchise involved, they contended, since the case does not concern the
right to vote but merely the regulation of the manner in which the vote is to be
cast.47
The Supreme Court granted the petition of the Progressives on Septem-
ber 7. The supersedeas was expunged and the entire cause transferred to the
Supreme Court. With all parties face to face at last, briefs were filed and argu-
ment completed shortly thereafter. Since no decision was rendered by the court
prior to the election, the ruling of the Circuit Court remained in effect and the
Progressive Party was able to appear on the November ballot in Cook County.4
On November i8 the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
Circuit Court, holding that the Progressives were entitled to make use of the
vacancy provisions of the Election Code because any existing office without an
incumbent is vacant. "There is no basis for the distinction that [the word 'va-
cancy'] applies only to an office vacated by death, resignation or otherwise."49
Furthermore, the court held that the Managing Committees of the Party did
have authority to fill the vacancies.
The brief filed by the Attorney General on behalf of the Secretary of State
raises an important question. The Attorney General listed twelve "errors relied
upon by Edward J. Barrett, Secretary of State"so and proceeded to set forth
the arguments in favor of each. But in each case he concluded that the argu-
ments were untenable as a matter of law and ought to be rejected. The conclu-
sion of the Attorney General's brief is worthy of quotation in fullhs
The Attorney General having, as attorney for Edward J. Barrett, Secretary of
State, herewith presented every possible ground for reversal which could be urged by
said appellant, but, under his higler, greater, and paramount duty to the people, having
as attorney for the people of the State of Illinois, likewise presented the contrary
considerations which lead him irresistibly to the conclusions that the plaintiffs were
and are entitled to all of the relief which they sought and were granted below and that
the order of the trial court, from which this appeal has been prosecuted, was and is
wholly without error;--prays that this Honorable Court consider the matters and things
raised by this appeal and afflrm the judgment below.5'
47 Defendants' Reply to Petition, at 7-16.
48 Following the expunction of the supersedeas by the Supreme Court, the defendant
County Clerk reluctantly conceded that he would place the Progressives on the Cook County
ballot, reportedly commenting: "I'm not going to jail for anybody." Chicago Sun-Times, p. 2,
col. 3 (A.M. ed., Sept. 8, 1948).
49 Progressive Party v. Flynn, 82 N.E. 2d 476, 481 (Ill., 1948).
so Brief for Attorney General as Attorney for Secretary of State, at 17.
s, Ibid., at 46.
2KoKo: Now, as my Solicitor, how do you advise me to deal with this difficulty?
Poo-BA: Oh, as your Solicitor, I should have no hesitation in saying "chance it-."
Koxo: Thank you, I will.
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The other defendants (including the Attorney General's client, the Secretary
of State) professed astonishment at this course. They were unable to under-
stand how a new client-namely, the People of the State of Illinois-had sud-
denly made an appearance in the proceedings, and they filed a formal objection
to the tactics of the Attorney General "which seriously prejudiced their cause.".5
They further urged that the Attorney General by now asking for affirmance had
abandoned his appeal and consequently should have no standing in the case at
all. This argument was summarily rejected by the Illinois court on the ground
that once jurisdiction had attached to the court it could not be divested by a
concession of one of the parties concerning the rights of the other5 4 But in
adopting this view the court stressed the fact that the other defendants had
failed to cite any authority in support of their contentions.
Proceedings in which the Attorney General presents the arguments for both
parties, while unusual, are not unprecedented.s What was unique in the instant
case was the fact that the arguments of both sides were presented in the same
brief. Apparently the Attorney General felt it necessary to set forth the argu-
ments for reversal, arguments which he rejected, in order to avoid the conse-
quences of those decisions which hold that an appeal is abandoned where the
appellant presents no argument in its support, or appears only as respondent.s6
On the other hand, there is more authority for the proposition that where the
Attorney General is confronted by conflicting duties he must perform only that
duty which is most in accord with the public interest s7 In the instant case it
would seem that his duty to his statutory client was paramount since the argu-
ments on behalf of the Progressives were to be presented to the court in any
PooH-BAi: If it were not that, as Lord Chief justice, I am bound to see that the law
isn't violated.
KoKo: I see. Come over here where the Chief Justice can't hear us. Now, then, as First
Lord of the Treasury?
Poo-BAx: Of course, as First Lord of the Treasury, I could propose a special vote that
would cover all expenses, if it were not that, as Leader of the Opposition, it would be my duty
to resist it, tooth and nail. Or, as Paymaster-General, I could so cook the accounts that, as
Lord High Auditor, I should never discover the fraud. But then, as Archbishop of Titipu, it
would be my duty to denounce my dishonesty and give myself into my own custody as First
Commissioner of Police.
KoKo: That's extremely awkward.
Gilbert and Sullivan, The Mikado, Act I.
s3 Defendants' Reply to Petition, at 20-22.
S4 Progressive Party v. Flynn, 82 N.E. 2d 476, 480 (MI., I948)t
ss See Reiter v. Wallgren, 28 Wash. 2d 872, x84 P. 2d 571, 575 (1947); cf. Attorney General
v. Hunt, 59 Ariz. 256, 258, 126 P. 2d 303, 304 (1942), vacated on rehearing 59 Ariz. 312, 127 P.
2d 130 (1942).
s
6 Hilmes v. Moon, i68 Wash. 222, Ir P. 2d 253 (i932); Fields v. Sanders, 29 Calif. 2d 834,
i8o P. 2d 684 (1947).
7 Marsh v. Aljoe, 41 Wyo. 119, 282 Pac. 1o55 (1929); Attorney General v. State Board of
Equalization, 14o Wash. 433, 249 Pac. 996 (1926); Frohmiller v. Hendrix, 59 Ariz. 184, 124
P. 2d 768 (1942).
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event by their own counselsS Certainly this should be the case where no formal
demand has been made upon the Attorney General for his services on behalf of
the people s9
In Illinois, the Attorney General is the sole representative of state officials.6°
That being the case, it is usually held that any state official who disagrees with
the manner in which the Attorney General is conducting his defense may con-
duct his own defense, provided that no additional expense is thereby caused the
state.6 Under such circumstances the Attorney General should not be permitted
to carry on a separate defense in the name of the official.62
Several conclusions may be drawn from this examination of the course of Pro-
gressive Party litigation in Illinois which would seem to have general applica-
tion to any statutory provisions respecting minority political parties. Most ob-
vious is the fact that "politics" must inevitably play a large role in the proceed-
ings. Since the public officials representing the state will always be members of
one or the other major party, the strategic decisions, including the choice of
dilatory tactics, will be made not merely with a view toward winning the case
itself but rather in the light of their effect upon that party's chances of winning
the election. The difficulty is somewhat ameliorated by the fact that the two
major parties may have divergent views toward the presence of a new party, but
in any event the interests of the public and of the new party as well, are likely to
be lost sight of in the process.
Secondly, this litigation, as well as the subsequent Progressive Party case in
the federal courts, discussed hereafter, clearly emphasizes the importance of the
time element in this type of proceeding. No cause of action can accrue to the
new party until it appears that an effort will be made to keep it off the ballot,
and this will necessarily be very near election time. Once the election has passed,
the party is in a position only to claim damages for deprivation of the right to
vote, at best a small consolation. 63
58 Marsh v. Aljoe, 41 Wyo. "39, 282 Pac. IoSS (1929); cf. Reiter v. Wallgren, 28 Wash. 2d
872, 184 P. 2d 571 (1947).
59 Reiter v. Wallgren, 28 Wash. 2d 872, 184 P. 2d 571 (1947). But cf. Attorney General v.
State Board of Equalization, 140 Wash. 433, 249 Pac. 996 (1926) (Attorney General's para-
mount duty is the protection of the interests of the people, and where he is cognizant of viola-
tions by a state officer his duty is to obstruct and not assist).
6o Fergus v. Russell, 270 Ill. 304, 337, iio N.E. 130, 145 (1915).
61 Frohmiller v. Hendrix, 59 Ariz. 184, 124 P. 2d 768 (1942); Amerland v. Hagen, 44 N.D.
3o6, 75 N. W. 372 (i919); see Piccirilli Bros. v. Lewis, 282 Penn. 328, 336, 127 Ati. 832, 835
(1925) (may employ private counsel at own expense to present views but such counsel may
not appear of record).
62 Frohmiller v. Hendrix, 59 Ariz. 184, 124 P. 2d 768 (1942); Amerland v. Hagen, 44 N.D.
306, 175 N.W. 372 (1919).
63 See Blackman v. Stone, 17 F. Supp. 102 (1., 1936), vacated on ground of mootness 300
U.S. 641 (1936). In later proceedings for damages for deprivation of the right to vote, the con-
stitutional question was for the first time considered on the merits and then only by way of
dictum. Blackman v. Stone, ioi F. 2d Soo (C.C.A. 7th, 1939).
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Of even greater importance, perhaps, these proceedings emphasize the fact
that statutory provisions relating to new parties, because used so seldom, are
likely to be difficult to handle when the occasion does arise, and may even pre-
sent unforeseen contradictions. At the very least, they will provide the defend-
ants with many opportunities to employ procedural moves of a dilatory nature.
Since time is always working strongly against the minority party, it is impor-
tant that a clear-cut interpretation of the statute be had in advance of any at-
tempt to make use of it. Yet this is impossible, even where a declaratory judg-
ment act is in effect, and the only remedy appears to be good draftsmanship, an
attribute notably lacking in many state legislatures. Finally, these cases definite-
ly sanction the use of the declaratory judgment as a device for the determina-
tion of political and constitutional questions, thus making available the only
means by which a new party can even hope to surmount the obstacles presented
by the shortness of time.6 4
II
Concurrent with the Cook County litigation the Progressive Party began its
efforts for a state-wide place on the ballot and for the opportunity to run candi-
dates for President, Vice-President, United States Senator, and for all state-
wide offices.1 During the summer the party circulated petitions bearing the
names of twenty-eight presidential electors and candidates for various state-
wide offices, and filed them in accordance with the statute, which requires a
total of twenty-five thousand signatures including at least two hundred from
each of fifty counties. Objections were presented, and in accordance with Arti-
cle io, Section io of the Election Code, the State Officers Electoral Board met
64 Certain language of Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946),
indicated that a declaratory judgment would be proper only in a case where an injunction
could be had. See Applicability of Limitations on the Use of the Injunction in Constitutional
Litigation to the Federal Declaratory Judgment, 35 Calif. L. Rev. 252 (i947); Need for In-
junctive Relief as Prerequisite for Granting Declaratory Judgment, 56 Yale L.J. 139 (1946).
MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948), indicates that the Supreme Court has now aban-
doned that proposition. However, the case is not conclusive since injunctive relief was re-
quested along with the declaratory judgment.
65 The applicable portions of the Election Code are the following: Art. io, § 2: "[A]nd if
such new political party shall be formed for the entire state, [the petitions] shall be signed by
not less than twenty five thousand (25,ooo) qualified voters: Provided, that included in the
aggregate total.. . are the signatures of two hundred (2oo) qualified voters from each of at
least fifty (5o) counties within the State." Art. io, § 4 provides that the signers of petitions
must be registered voters who have not voted at a primary held to nominate candidates for any
of the offices to which the petition is applicable. Art. io, §§ 6, 8 state that the petitions are
to be presented to the State Certifying Board, consisting of the Governor, Secretary of State,
and State Auditor, and shall be deemed valid unless objected to by any legal voter within five
days after the last day for filing. Art. io, §§ 9, io provide a procedure for the hearing of objec-
tions to petitions. The Secretary of State, Auditor of Public Accounts, and Attorney General
shall constitute themselves as the State Officers Electoral Board to hear and pass upon objec-
tions. In the event that any of these members are also candidates for the offices in question,
they shall be replaced by Justices of the State Supreme Court. The Electoral Board is invested
with the power to subpoena records, compel testimony, and administer oaths.
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in the Capitol Building at Springfield on August 26 to conduct hearings on the
petitions.66
In the course of the hearings the objectors conceded that the petitions con-
tained over twenty-five thousand valid signatures and that the two-hundred-
signature requirement had been satisfied in forty-one of the necessary fifty
counties. They conceded that the petitions lacked only a total of from eighty-
three to one hundred and ten signatures, distributed among nine counties. The
Progressive Party maintained that the objectors bad failed to prove that the
requirements were not satisfied in sixty-two counties. 67
On August 31 the Board issued its decision, finding as a matter of fact that
the petitions did not bear two hundred valid signatures from each of fifty coun-
ties, and hence the Progressive Party was not entitled to have its candidates ap-
pear on the November ballot outside of Cook County.68 Subsequently, on Sep-
66 Since the Progressives were running candidates for Secretary of State and Attorney
General, those two officers retired from the Electoral Board and were replaced by Justices
Gunn and Wilson of the Illinois Supreme Court. The third member of the Board was the State
Auditor. But before the composition of the Electoral Board was finally determined there took
place a ludicrous series of maneuvers which well illustrates the atmosphere in which the entire
litigation was conducted. Although the Electoral Board is presumably an impartial fact-
finding body, the Democrats were keenly desirous of constituting a majority, and the Republi-
cans and Progressives were equally anxious to have a Republican majority. Originally, the
Progressives had nominated candidates for Secretary of State and for Attorney General, thus
disqualifying the incumbents of these offices from sitting on the board. At 5 o'clock on August
21, the last day upon which a candidate was permitted to withdraw, the Progressive candi-
date for Secretary of State suddenly withdrew from the contest. This would have permitted the
Democratic Secretary of State, E. J. Barrett, to resume his place on the board, while at the
same time it would be too late for the Progressives to withdraw their candidate for Attorney
General in order to permit Republican G. F. Barrett to return. The Progressives instead
nominated a new candidate for Secretary of State under the vacancy provisions of Art. io,
§§ ii and 12 of the Election Code, and the certificate of nomination was promptly signed by
the two Republican certifying officers, the Governor and State Auditor. The third certifying
officer, Secretary of State Barrett, refused to sign the certificate, claiming that it was legally im-
possible to fill the vacancy. MacDougall v. Green, 8o F. Supp. 725 (Ill., 1948), Complaint,
exhibit B. The Progressives then obtained a restraining order from the Sangamon County
(Springfield) Circuit Court, forbidding Barrett to sit on the Board. This was followed by a
permanent injunction having the force of mandamus. Justice Gun replaced Barrett, but the
latter still failed to sign the nominating certificate. After the issuance of an impounding order,
the Secretary "lost" the certificate and it was never recovered. The Progressives then made an
unsuccessul attempt to have the Secretary jailed for contempt. MacDougall v. Green, ibid.,
Complaint, exhibit C.
67 Detailed statistics of the respective contentions will be found in MacDougall v. Green,
8o F. Supp. 725 (Ill., 1948), Complaint, exhibits E and F. Most of the discrepancies arose from
the fact that signers of the petitions were later discovered to have voted at the primary or to be
unregistered and hence disqualified. The Progressives were, of course, unable to obtain new
signatures to replace those disqualified since the deadline for filing of petitions, seventy-eight
days before the general election, had already passed. Election Code Art. io, § 6 (Supp., I948).
68 MacDougall v. Green, 8o F. Supp. 725 (Ill., 1948), Complaint, exhibit D. The Election
Code makes no provision for appeal from the decision of the Electoral Board. The Progressive
Party might conceivably have chosen to carry on their fight along the line that there is a
constitutional right to judicial review of the Board's decision. Apart from other considerations,
the shortness of time remaining until the election made this course impractical. Only questions
of fact were involved in the Board's decision, and no court would be likely to upset the findings
of fact when two Justices of the State Supreme Court were sitting on that board.
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tember 13 and September 23, the Progressive Party made two separate mo-
tions in the State Supreme Court to obtain leave to file petitions for mandamus
in that Court. They sought to obtain an adjudication of the constitutionality
of the 1935 Amendment to Section 2 of Article io of the Election Code which
provides for the geographical distribution of signatures, and in each case the
motion was denied without opinion. The Party did not attempt to obtain certi-
orari from the United States Supreme Court to review these rulings in view of
that Court's decision in White v. Ragen,69 but instead on September 24 filed a
complaint in the United States District Court asking for a declaratory judgment
and injunctive relief. The three state officers who, under Section 6 of Article io,
were charged with the duty of certifying the names of candidates were named
as defendants together with various county and municipal election officials.7
The plaintiff alleged that the 1935 Amendment which added the signature
distribution requirement to the then existing provisions for nominations by the
petition method7z was unconstitutional as constituting an arbitrary, unreason-
able, and discriminatory restriction on the right of qualified voters to nominate
and vote for candidates of their own choice, in violation of Sections 2 and 4 of
Article I, and Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution, and Article
II, Section i8 of the Illinois Constitution.
The jurisdiction of the District Court was predicated upon Section 1343(3) of
the new judicial Code.72 The cause was heard in Chicago by a three-judge Dis-
trict Court under authority of Section 2281 of the judicial Code, and a decision
rendered on October ii denying the motion for an interlocutory injunction
and dismissing the complaint on the grounds that the i935 Amendment was not
repugnant to the United States or Illinois constitutions. 73
Direct appeal to the Supreme Court is a matter of right where a three-judge
District Court is involved.74 That Court, in view of the imminence of the elec-
tion, granted appellant's motion to advance and expedite the hearing. Briefs
were submitted, oral argument heard on October i8, and a decision handed
down on October 21,75 a remarkable example of the Court's willingness to ac-
69 324 U.S. 760 (1945).
70 The three members of the State Officers Electoral Board, the bodywhich had invalidated
the nominating petitions, were not named as defendants since no relief was requested against
them. MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948), Appellant's Supplemental Memorandum
at 2.
71 Election Code Art. io, § 2. If this amendment had been invalidated the Election Code
would have remained in effect as it was before 1935-that is, without the signature distribu-
tion requirements but with the same overall signature requirements. Cf. Rippinger v. Niederst,
317 Ill. 264, 272, 148 N.E. 7, 10 (1925); People v. Butler Street Foundry, 201 Ill. 236, 257,
66 N.E. 349, 356 (I9O3).
72 "The District Court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action .... (3) To re-
dress the deprivation under color of any State law, statute... or usage, of any right, privilege
or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States .... " 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(3)
(Supp., 1948).
73 MacDougall v. Green, 8o F. Supp. 725 (Ill., 1948).
74 28 U.S.C.A. § 1253 (Supp., 1948). 7S MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948).
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commodate itself to the requirements of an emergency situation. The appellant
argued that in view of the short time remaining until the election all conceivably
effective state remedies had been exhausted, but that in any event a preliminary
expedition to the state courts was not required.76 In support of their contention
that the statute was arbitrary and unreasonable, the Progressives pointed out
that the forty-one counties in which the petitions were admittedly valid con-
tained eighty per cent of the state's population. Yet even if all the inhabitants
thereof desired to form a new party, they could not do so. Eighty-seven per cent
of the population residing in the forty-nine most populous counties could not do
so. On the other hand, the thirteen per cent of the population residing in the
fifty least populous counties would be able to establish a new party.7 7 It was
pointed out that a geographical distribution requirement exists nowhere else in
Illinois election law.
The appellant contended that the law discriminated in a twofold manner:
against the voters in the more populous counties and in favor of those in less
populous areas, and against those voters who wish to form a new party and in
favor of members of established parties who are subject to no geographical dis-
tribution requirements. Furthermore, it was argued, this discrimination fits into
the general pattern of political power in Illinois-a pattern of downstate con-
trol-evidenced most conspicuously in the long fight over reapportionment.8
The Progressives contended that the i935 Amendment violated the privileges
and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as follows:79 The right to
vote for federal officers is a right protected by the United States Constitution."
Where a primary is an integral part of the electoral process it is protected by the
Constitution."' The right to nominate candidates for federal office by primary
is an integral part of the electoral process. 82 Nomination by petition is analogous
to nomination byprimaryand is so recognized in the Illinois Election Code. There-
fore, the right to nominate federal officers by petition is protected by the United
States Constitution. The Illinois statute in question is an abridgment of that
right since it deprives even a majority of qualified voters of the opportunity to
nominate candidates by petition unless they meet the distribution requirements.
Moreover, because of the discrimination described above, the statute also vio-
lates the equal protection clause just as did the "white primary" laws struck
76 Citing Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 274 (1939).
77 Appellant's brief, at 24.
78 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), noted in 56 Yale L.J. 127 (I946); 41 Ill. L.
Rev. 578 (1946); 45 Mich. L. Rev. 368 (i947). Appellants contended that the failure of Illinois
to apportion congressional districts deprived them of constitutional rights because their vote
was less influential than that of residents of less populous districts. The merits of the consti-
tutional question were not decided.
79 Appellant's brief, at 29.
so Ex parte Yarbrough, uio U.S. 65i (1884); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
91 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 36 (i941).
81 Breckton v. Election Commissioners, 221 BI. 9, 18, 77 N.E. 321, 323 (19o6).
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down in Nixon v. Herndon,83 Nixon v. Condon,8 4 Smith v. Allwright,85 and
Rice v. Elmore.8 6 Appellants then contended that if the 1935 Amendment was
unconstitutional as applied to candidates for federal office, namely United
States Senator, it must fail in its entirety.87
The Progressives urged additionally that the provisions in question violated
the Seventeenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section i8
of Article II of the Illinois Constitution.88 In conclusion appellant maintained
that the Court could enter an effective order granting the requested relief, thus
eliminating the issue that proved decisive in Colegrove v. Green.89 Clearly the
crucial question in the Progressives' argument was whether or not the geographi-
cal distribution requirement was in fact arbitrary or unreasonably discrimina-
tory. The Assistant State's Attorney of Cook County, representing some of the
defendants, argued that it was not. Attorney General Barrett, this time repre-
senting the defendant certifying officers, appeared before the Court, confessed
error, and asked for reversal.
The decision of the Supreme Court, per curiam, in MacDougall v: Green,90
was joined in by five justices. Justice Rutledge concurred on the sole ground that
equity could not enter an effective order.91 Justices Douglas, Black, and Murphy
dissented. The Court found no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the
Illinois election law. "It would be strange indeed, and doctrinaire for this Court,
applying such broad constitutional concepts as due process and equal protection
of the laws, to deny a State the power to assure a proper diffusion of political
initiative as between its thinly populated counties and those having concen-
83 273 U.S. 536 (1927). S 321 U.S. 649 (i944).
84 286 U.S. 73 (1932)- 86 i65 F. 2d 387 (C.C.A. 4th, 1947).
87 Citing Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 638 (1915). The 1935 Amendment to the Illinois
Election Code contains no severability clause.
s The Illinois Supreme Court has stated: "[Tihe people registered their will that... the
vote of every qualified elector shall be equal in its influence with that of every other one, by Sec-
tion 18 of the Bill of Rights, providing that all elections shall be free and equal" (italics
added). Breckton v. Election Commissioners, 221 Ill. 9, 17, 77 N.E. 321,322 (i9o6).
89 328 U.S. 549 (1946). Throughout the course of litigation counsel for the Progressive
Party found it necessary to emphasize that Colegrove v. Green did not hold that equity has
no jurisdiction to decide political questions. Only three of the seven justices who heard that
case believed that equity did not have jurisdiction to decide it. Consequently the actual grounds
of decision were those of Justice Rutledge, who specifically stated that equity did have juris-
diction, but thought that the Court should refuse to upset the existing apportionment in
Illinois because the results of such action might prove disastrous.
9o 335 U.S. 281 (1948).
91 Justice Rutledge's position is the same as that taken by him in Colegrove v. Green,
328 U.S. 549 (1946). See note 89 supra. His finding of want of equity, an exercise of the dis-
cretionary powers of a court of equity, was based upon his belief that any affirmative action
taken by the Court was likely to lead to results more undesirable than those resulting from
failure to act at all, and upon his belief that the decision of constitutional issues should be
avoided whenever possible. See Colegrove v. Green, ibid., at 564.
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trated masses.... The Constitution-a practical instrument of government-
makes no such demand on the states."92
The issues in MacDougall v. Green were decided squarely upon the merits.
Thus, the Court clearly took a step beyond the much discussed Colegrove v.
Green where the decision rested upon want of equity. The language quoted gives
reason to believe that a majority of the Court approves the notion that a state
may, whether by failure to apportion legislative districts or by a requirement
like that found in the Illinois Election Code, give increased political influence to
particular segments of the population. Fortunately, the majority opinion in
MacDougall v. Green provides a safeguard to prevent possible abuses of this pow-
er, such as the disenfranchisement of Negroes in the South by the substitution
of a petition method of nomination for the primary, or by a gerrymandering of
electoral districts: The "weighting" of votes or of voters' signatures must bear a
reasonable relationship to a permissible end.
The Court stated that while it is true that the voters of the less populous
counties have the power to completely block nominations, yet only thirty-nine
per cent of the signatures need come from outside of Cook County. Cook Coun-
ty, which contains fifty-two per cent of the state's population, may provide up
to sixty-one per cent of the signatures. Thus, the power which the Illinois
statute grants to the less populous counties is not disproportionate to an allow-
able state policy, namely, "that candidates for state-wide office should have sup-
port not limited to a concentrated locality." The Court further pointed out that
such a policy would assure a proper diffusion of political initiative, which is in
turn justifiable in view of the fact that the residents of the populous counties
have "practical opportunities for exerting their political weight at the polls" not
available to the residents of the sparsely populated counties.93
Because of the inequitable apportionment of legislative districts, it would
seem that in Illinois the "practical opportunities for exerting weight at the polls"
might lie, in fact, with the residents of the less populous areas. Presumably what
the Court was referring to are the organizational advantages available to party
leaders in areas of concentrated population. The effect of the controverted
amendment to the Election Code is to destroy these advantages insofar as they
9MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 282 (1948).
931 bid., at 2. In a state where almost half of the population lives in cities of iooooo or more
it is rather difficult to find any justification for a policy which prevents a political party from
representing exclusively urban elements other than protection of the interests of already
existent parties. The development of a minority party speaking solely for the urban popula-
tion would in no way impair the ability of the non-urban populace to express itself politically.
While the state legislature might conceivably have adopted the policy that all political parties
should be cross-sectional, the legislative history of the Illinois statute in question shows no
such conscious intent. The controverted provision requiring geographical distribution of
signatures was added to a house bill by the Senate and passed both houses almost unanimously
and with apparently very little debate. Ill. H. Jour. 575, 1764 (1935); I11. S. Jour. io73, 1396
(1935). No committee reports were published and no discussion of the measure appears in any
Chicago newspapers of the period.
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effect the organization of new parties, and such is held to be permissible state
policy.
On well-established constitutional grounds, the Supreme Court will be re-
luctant to strike down state laws regulating political matters. But in the instant
case the majority went beyond a mere refusal to declare a law unconstitutional
and actually gave explicit approval to the policy represented by the Illinois elec-
tion statute. The Court assumed that the geographical distribution requirement
for petition signatures is a reasonable means to a permissible end-namely, the
diffusion of political initiative. But it is these presumptions which raise the pro-
vocative questions in MacDougall v. Green.
Whether or not diffusion of political initiative was in fact the objective sought
by the Illinois legislature when it passed the 1935 Amendment to the Election.
Code, the proposition that such diffusion is desirable in itself, a thesis apparent-
ly accepted without question by the Court, is at least a debatable one. No one
would deny that an increase in political initiatibe is desirable, and indeed essen-
tial, to a democracy. On the other hand, it is much less certain that a difusion is
likely to lead to an increase in political initiative-when diffusion goes too far
it may become mere waste effort. In any event, the result of statutes such as the
one in question will be to insure that any political party has widespread sup-
port, while at the same time insuring that there will be few political parties. It
might well be argued that a maximum diffusion of political initiative, if that is
desired, would be obtained under precisely converse conditions.94
In upholding the Illinois statute the Court said, "To assume that political
power is a function exclusively of numbers is to disregard the practicalities of
government."5S This proposition was supported by reference to the United
States Senate, which is based upon unequal representation of population. Yet, as
Hamilton made clear in Number 62 of The Federalist96 the true basis of the sys-
94 After the decision of the Illinois Electoral Board on August 31 the Illinois law attracted
wide attention in the press. Most of the comment, from all shades of political opinion, took the
view that whatever its constitutionality, the statute was undemocratic and undesirable. See
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, p. 4A, col. 3 (Oct. 23, 1948); Chicago Daily News, p. i6, col. i (Oct.
26, 1948); Chicago Sun-Times, p..39, col. 4 (Oct. 21, 1948), and p. 5, col. i (Sept. 2, 1948); 36
New Statesman and Nation 209 (Sept. i1, 1948).
A contrary view is presented in the Yale Law Journal, op. cit. supra note i, at 1289, where
it is said: "The requirement that such signatures be divided over a given number of counties
is but a call to develop the extensive local organization without which a party cannot hope to
win an election." But this view assumes that the placing of minor parties on the ballot is
justified only if the party has some prospect of winning the election. The generally accepted
view of the significance of minor party movements is in opposition to this premise. Authorities
cited note iog infra. Furthermore, one of the main arguments relied upon by the Progressive
Party in its attempt to invalidate the Illinois law was that a party might have the support of
an absolute majority of the voters of the state and still not be able to nominate its candidates
if those voters were concentrated in only a few counties, as they might conceivably be in a state
like Illinois where over half the population resides in a single county.
9s MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 282 (1948). The term 'political power' as used by the
Court clearly refers to the ultimate basis of all political power-that power residing in the
people by virtue of the franchise.
96 The Federalist Papers 340 (Scott ed., 1902).
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tern of representation in the Senate is the fact that each constituent state re-
mains a sovereign body. Story, in speaking of the Senate, went into this ques-
tion at length. He wrote:
In the first place, the very structure of the general government contemplated one
partly federal and partly national. It not only recognized the existence of the state
governments; but perpetuated them, leaving them in enjoyment of a large portion of
the rights of sovereignty .... [I]t would follow that a compound republic.., ought
to be founded on a mixture of proportional, and of equal representation .... If the
house is to be proportional ... tte senate should be fixed upon an absolute equality, as
the representative of state sopereignty.97
Since the Senate and the analogous Electoral College are the only examples
of disproportionate representation recognized in the Constitution, it would
seem that the Court, more accurately, might have said: Political power is a func-
tion of numbers exclusively, except insofar as modified by the demands of our
federal system with its accompanying measure of state sovereignty.
In the instant matter, Illinois has given a disproportionate influence to the
less populous counties. But counties are not sovereign bodies.98 They have only
such powers as may, for the time being, be delegated to them by the sovereign,99
and, indeed, an attempt to delegate exclusively sovereign powers may be held
invalid. ° ° Consequently it is submitted that the Supreme Court has pronounced
a new constitutional principle-namely, that political power is not a function of
numbers exclusively. As applied to the formation of new political parties, this
principle permits a state to exclude such parties by means which are at once
more effective and more subtle than the mere raising of total-signature require-
ments or other direct methods. As applied to a situation such as arose in Cole-
grove v. Green, the Court has now presumably decided that question upon the
merits. Disproportionate voting influence, due to an inequitable apportionment
of congressional or legislative districts, is not a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Further situations where this new principle will be applicable may
well arise in the future. At the very least, the decision in MacDougall v. Green
will serve as an open invitation to other states to adopt statutory provisions
similar to those in Illinois in order to exclude minority parties from the ballot.0°
Justices Douglas, Black, and Murphy, dissenting in MacDougall v. Green,
thought that the 1935 Amendment violated the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Nomination by petition, like nomination by primary,
97 i Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 492 (2d ed., 185i). Italics added.
9S Calhoun County Court v. Mathews, 99 W. Va. 483, 129 S.E. 399 (1925); Keefe v.
Schmiege, 251 Wis. 79, 28 N.W. 2d 345 (i947).
99 Laramie County v. Albany County, 92 U.S. 307 (i875); Thompson v. Lee County, 3
Wall. (U.S.) 327 (1865); Milliken v. Edgar County, 142 Il. 528, 32 N.E. 493 (1892).
110 Keefe v. Schmiege, 25I Wis. 79, 28 N.W. 2d 345 (i947).
xoz Three other states now have geographical distribution requirements for nominating
petition signatures. Ohio Code Ann. (Throckmorton, Supp., 1948) § 4785-91; Mass. Ann.
Laws (i947) c. 53, § 6; N.Y. Election Law (McKinney, 1947) § 137 (4).
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they said, is an integral part of the electoral process and is constitutionally pro-
tected. They concluded that a state law is invalid if discrimination results from
its operation1°2
While the actual decision of the majority in MacDougall v. Green was neither
unexpected nor unwarranted, the grounds upon which that decision was based
came as a surprise from a court which has, in the long series of "white primary"
cases, shown the greatest solicitude for the sanctity of the electoral process as a
whole, and has been quick to impose the sanctions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment upon any state law which tended to discriminate against any group in its
operation.103
The array of unforeseen complications and procedural problems which made
their appearance during the course of the Progressive Party litigation in Illinois
]ends support to the theory that there should be a presumption against restric-
tions upon the free entry of minority parties to the political arena. But the ex-
clusion of minority parties from the ballot might, of course, be justified on
grounds of fundamental policy-as, for example, upon the premise that the
preservation of the two-party system of government is contingent upon it. That
a two-party, in contrast to a multi-party, system is characteristic of the most
highly developed forms of political democracy and is, perhaps, the only frame-
work within which democracy can effectively work, are propositions which
have wide acceptance.1°4
Admitting the superiority of a two-party system, it is nevertheless believed
that rigid restrictions on the formation of new parties are not justified.1°5 Quite
- MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 285 (x948).
103 See The Right To Vote in Southern Primaries, 15 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 756 (1948).
104 Sait, op. cit. supra note 3, at 245; 1 Lowell, The Government of England 458 (3d ed.,
1912). The persuasive argument for this conclusion has been succinctly stated by Prof. Laski:
"But the superiority of a two-party system over a multiplicity of groups is above all in this,
that it is the only method by which the people can at the electoral period directly choose its
government. It enables that government to drive its policy to the statute-book. It makes
known and intelligible the results of its failure.... The group-system always means ... that
the executive will represent, not a general body of opinion, but a patchwork of doctrines which
compromise their integrity for the sake of power. It means, also, short-lived administrations,
since reshuffling of the groups to overthrow the government is the most interesting exercise in
which the legislature can indulge .... While the group-system probably reflects more accu-
rately the way in which the popular mind is actually divided, it is fatal to government as a
practical art." Laski, A Grammar of Politics 314 (1929).
For contrary views see 2 Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties
652 (ist ed., 1902); Holcombe, Theory of Political Parties, 6 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 590 (1937).
105 Ironically, the Comment in the Yale Law journal, op. cit. supra note i, after examining
and assessing the statutory provisions of all states, fails to include Illinois among the twenty
states in which it is "difficult" for a third party to get on the ballot. It is believed, however,
that the Illinois law does present a serious obstacle to the appearance of minority parties on
the ballot, although not for the reasons suggested by William H. Miller, State Director, Pro-
gressive Party, in a letter to the Yale Law Journal. Yale L.J., op. cit. supra note i, at 1280 n. 16.
The real obstacle lies in the admitted fact that the law prevents a party from representing
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apart from the civil liberties aspects of such restrictions °6 there is little reason to
believe that new minority parties pose a threat to the continuation of our two-
party system. At least two hundred years of Anglo-American political history
bear ample witness to the unvarying ability of our political system to return al-
ways to its two-party form in spite of complete freedom of entry granted to new
parties.107 Of course a new party has occasionally replaced one of the two estab-
lished parties,rog but it would be difficult to find any theoretical objection to this
result.
The role of minor parties, however, is not primarily to compete with the ma-
jor parties for the emoluments of political power, and it would be a serious mis-
exclusively urban elements. See note 93 supra. Another obstacle arises because the statute
greatly eases the task facing objectors to the petitions by making it necessary for them success-
fully to challenge only a relatively small number of strategically located signatures. Without
the distribution requirement the objectors must indiscriminately attack a long list which may
contain two or three times the minimum required number of names unless the statute sets a
maximum number of signatures.
Mr. Miller, in his communication to the Yale Law journal, expressed his belief that since
the average downstate county had a population of only ioooo this would leave a reser-
voir of only about 2,500 eligible persons from whom to obtain the needed 200 signatures.
As a matter of fact, only 9 of the io2 Illinois counties have a population of io,ooo or less,
although 51 do have populations under 25,000. Mr. Miller also underestimates the ratio of
registered voters to total population and overestimates the percentage of registered voters
who vote at the primary. In any event, a new party will ordinarily concentrate its signature-
seeking efforts in the more populous counties and will tend to ignore the smaller rural areas.
An analysis of the 21 counties which were disputed before the Illinois Electoral Board shows
that their total populations ranged from ii,ooo (Kendall) to I13,ooo (Rock Island). The total
number of potential petition signers (i.e., total registered voters less those who voted at the pri-
mary) ranged from 4,500 to 55,ooo, the mean average number being 17,972 persons and the me-
dian number (Morgan County) being 12,705. This means that the Progressives, in order to get
their two hundred signatures, would have had to obtain i.i i per cent of all potentially available
signatures based on the mean average, or 1.57 per cent based on the median. These require-
ments are certainly not excessive and indicate that the real difficulty lies in the absence of
any substantial urban population in most counties and in the severe practical difficulties faced
by petition circulators in obtaining signatures and addresses that comply with the letter of the
law as to form and detail. Population figures cited herein are from x6th Census of the United
States (194o), General Characteristics of the Population, Vol. II, part 2, at 5oo. Primary vote
figures are taken from Official Vote of the State of Illinois Cast at Primary Election, April x3,
1948 (Office of Secretary of State, Springfield). Registration figures estimated from various
sources.
In this connection it should be noted that the three minority parties which did appear on
the November 1948 ballot in Illinois owe their appearance, in all probability, to the fact that
their nominating petitions went unchallenged. This indicates that the mere presence or
absence of minority parties on the state's ballot is not a good criterion for judging the severity
of statutory restrictions.
i, 6 See American Civil Liberties Union, Minority Parties on the Ballot 2-8 (1940). The
presence of statutory provisions for write-in votes does not in any substantial way serve as a
substitute for minority parties as a means of giving expression to dissident political opinion.
See Ragan v. Junkin, 85 Neb. i, 6, 122 N.W. 473, 475 (1909).
x07 A brief summary of these developments is presented in Salt, op. cit. supra note 3, at 230.
X08 The outstanding examples of this process are the growth of the British Labor Party
and its subsequent replacement of the Liberal Party, and the rise of the Republican Party in
the United States.
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take to judge their success solely in terms of the vote they receive. Traditionally,
the role of third parties has been to serve as generators of new ideas which are
then adopted and effectuated by one of the major parties. Political scientists
have almost universally recognized this role as an extremely valuable one.' °9
It would seem especially valuable in a nation where, until recently at least, both
major parties have been cross-sectional parties with platforms that have tended
to duplicate each other to a large extent.110
Efforts to exclude third parties from the ballot have also been justified on the
ground that the public has an interest in keeping the ballot unencumbered.
Yet the type of encumbrance which results from the addition of two or three ad-
ditional party columns to the ballot is not of the same nature as that which re-
sults from the proverbial "six-foot ballot," where the average voter has never
heard of the offices being contested, let alone the candidates running for them.
Certainly, the public interest in the free circulation of new ideas should be con-
trolling.Y'
Since the influence of dissident opinion only rarely becomes effective through
the minor party itself, but usually achieves effectiveness only through the force
it exerts on major-party policy, it has sometimes been suggested that the minor
party is really extraneous-that a new or unpopular idea actually becomes ac-
ceptable through mechanisms which lie outside the political party itself, and
that consequently the minor party serves no important function." 2 But several
reasons are apparent why political parties are likely to prove more effective than
nonpolitical movements as channels for the introduction of new ideas. The
threat of direct competition for votes is an extremely effective means of forcing
ideological concessions from the major parties or of actually assuming control of
a major party.2"S Furthermore, a psychological factor is involved: Followers of a
lo9 Holcombe, The Political Parties of Today 342 (1924); Merriam and Gosnell, The Ameri-
can Party System 34, 37 (194o); Herring, The Politics of Democracy i81 (194o); Haynes,
Third Party Movements since the Civil War 2 (1916); Binkley, American Political Parties
181 (1043).
xo It should be noted that the peculiar nature of the American Electoral College system
tends to give a greatly exaggerated influence to the votes cast for candidates of minority
parties, a situation well illustrated by the recent election in connection with Mr. Wallace's
votes. Although this fact has sometimes been used as an argument against minority political
parties, it would seem more properly to be an argument for the abolition or reform of the
Electoral College, an institution which apparently presents no compensating features.
- A brief description of the "short ballot" movement will be found in Merriam and Gosnell,
The American Party System 285-86 (1940). In Great Britain cluttering-up of the ballot is
avoided by a requirement that all candidates for parliament deposit a sum of £io. If the
candidate fails to receive one-eighth of the total vote cast in the district the deposit is forfeited.
This has proved quite effective in keeping the "nuisance" candidate off the ballot while at the
same time presenting no great obstacle to the candidates of minority groups. Representation
of the People Act, 7 & 8 George V, c. 64, §§ 26, 27 (I918); 12 Halsbury's Laws of England 252,
320 (2d ed., 1948).
"I Sait, op. cit. supra note 3, at 302.
X13 It is doubtful whether the National Non-Partisan League would have been able to cap-
ture control of the North Dakota Republican organization in the years just prior to I92o if the
League had not been a tightly organized political group. See Wilcox, An Historical Definition
of Northwestern Radicalism, 26 Miss. Valley Hist. Rev. 377 (1939)-
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new doctrine like to believe, however remote the possibility of realization, that
their candidates will shortly sweep into the seats of political power, and the
promise of such an event is an effective means of gaining support. And finally, of
course, there is always the possibility of the minor party actually replacing one
of the major parties, a possibility which, though remote, should not be ignored.
THE GROWTH OF THE INTERNATIONAL SHOE DOCTRINE
When residents of one state carry on business in another state through their
agents, the courts of the latter state cannot acquire jurisdiction in personam
over the nonresidents under the historical prerequisite of the presence of the
defendant., Yet common ideas of justice may require that the nonresidents be
subject to suit in the courts of the state in which they are doing business. Until
recently, the principal's absence from the state was thought to deny its courts
any power over him, if he were an individual. When the principal was a juristic
person further complexities appeared, 2 but the courts found it easier to develop
jurisdictional doctrines to meet the situation. Thus, under some circumstances,
the foreign corporation may be denied the privilege of doing business in the
state unless it has designated an agent in the state upon whom service of process
may be made. In the absence of such express consent by the corporation to the
exercise of jurisdiction,3 proper service of process 4 may nevertheless give a court
jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against the corporation. This power
has been based upon various concepts, the courts most often referring to the
"implied consent" of the corporation to the exercise of jurisdictions or to the
"presence" of the corporation wherever its activities are being carried on.6 The
x Unless, of course, the nonresident, if an individual, happens into the state at an oppor-
tune moment.
2Early in the nineteenth century it was thought impossible to acquire jurisdiction in
personam over a foreign corporation. Middlebrooks v. Springfield Fire Ins. Co., 14 Conn. 3oi
(1841); Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law 77
et seq. (i918).
3 When the corporation has expressly consented to jurisdiction over it, the extent of the
authority thereby conferred is a question of interpretation of the instrument of consent or of
the statute requiring it. Thus, the authorization of the agent to accept service of process may
include causes of action arising in other states. Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue
Mining and Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (i9I 7); Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal and Iron
Co., 222 Fed. 148 (D.C. N.Y., 1915). Or it may be construed to refer only to causes of action
arising out of business done in the state. Dunn v. Cedar Rapids Engineering Co., 152 F. 2d
733 (C.C.A. 9th, 1945). Cases involving express consent are not considered in this note.
4 Of course, a judgment against a foreign corporation, or any other defendant, is void
unless the method of service employed is reasonably calculated to give notice to the defendant
and to afford it an opportunity to be heard. Rest., Judgments §§ 6, 3o (1942); 1 Beale, Conflict
of Laws § 89. 3 (1935). This note is concerned with the other element of jurisdiction-the
power of a state to subject a person to its control.
s Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 18 How. (U.S.) 404 (1855); Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602 (1899).
6 International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914); Philadelphia & Reading
Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917); Bank of America v. Whitney Cent. Nat. Bank, 261
U.S. 171 (1923).
